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Abstract: The rhetoric and mechanisms of the market have become embedded in public 
policies with the hegemony of neoliberalism. Markets traditionally supplying public goods have 
been transformed, a strong exemplar of which is Australia. Using an analytical framework 
which dissects the structure, operation, interactions and outcomes of real world markets, five 
Australian markets are analysed to reveal the eligibility rules for access and ongoing 
participation, interaction of participants, the role of intermediaries and government, the extent 
of competition, the complex regulatory regimes shaping and controlling these markets, and key 
market outcomes. Contrary to neoliberalism’s free market rhetoric and the view promulgated 
by mainstream economics, it is found that there is a spectrum of market configurations and 
governance regimes, participation is highly dependent on technology access and skills, market 
outcomes are inconsistent with policy rhetoric, market interrelationships pose adverse 
cumulative impacts, and government is strongly interventionist through a multiplicity of roles.  
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A vast range of public policies have been restructured around market-based mechanisms 
based on economic concepts derived from the logic of perfect competitive markets. 
‘Government by the market’, ‘market governance’, and ‘market-based policy’ are among the 
labels applied to this phenomenon and Australia is a strong exemplar. The widespread 
adoption of market-based policy instruments has meant substantial change to Australian 
markets which have traditionally supplied public goods such as electricity, water, education, 
health insurance, public housing, infrastructure, and services for the disabled, aged and 
unemployed. Most noticeably, direct provision by government of these goods and services has 
been supplanted and there have been significant pricing changes.   
 Contemporary Australian public policies are almost exclusively framed in abstract 
terms of competition, economic efficiency, supply and demand, or the need to address market 
failures. This is the lexicon of neoclassical economics which portrays the market as a normative 
ideal framed around a set of abstract assumptions. These assumptions are incompatible with 
reality and cannot explain the operation and outcomes of these transformed markets for 
public goods (Chester 2009).  
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Actually existing – not abstract - Australian contemporary markets are the focus of this 
paper. How are these markets organised? What ensures their ongoing functioning? What is 
the nature of the goods and services provided by these markets? How does this differ from 
previous provision? What issues or barriers do Australians encounter when engaging with 
these markets? To what extent do these markets ensure adequate provision to those on lower 
incomes? What outcomes are these markets delivering?  
These are the questions which this paper seeks to answer through an analysis of five 
contemporary real world markets that impact on the daily circumstances and standard of living 
of the vast majority of Australians – electricity, water, employment services for the 
unemployed, housing for the low-income and carbon trading. The examples have been 
deliberately chosen for their breadth of impact across the lives, well-being and social inclusion 
of the population irrespective of geographical location or stage of the lifecycle.  The analysis 
elucidates the eligibility rules and barriers to market access and on-going participation, the 
institutions that organise the functioning of these markets, price determination, the 
interaction between participants and the role of intermediaries, the form of competition in 
each market, the complexity created by market-based policies, the multiple roles played by 
government, the key market outcomes, and the similarities and differences between markets.  
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the broader political economy 
context in which markets for public goods have been restructured by public policies 
embodying the rhetoric of neoliberalism and neoclassical economics. The changing 
institutional architecture of the Australian mode of régulation since the 1980s is discussed 
along with the form and nature of interventions by the state at both macro and micro levels. 
The disjuncture between neoliberalism’s free market rhetoric and actual outcomes is also 
explored. The focus of Section 3 is the five contemporary Australian markets for electricity, 
water, services for the unemployed, housing for low-income Australians, and carbon trading. 
The section presents the analytical framework utilised, an overview of the development and 
operation of each market analysed and a detailed comparison of the five markets’ structural 
features, interactions and outcomes. A final section canvasses the implications of the findings, 
including the disjuncture with the abstraction and assumptions of mainstream neoclassical 
economics which have imbued Australian public policy.   
 
2 The case of neoliberal Australia 
 
2.1 Rhetoric and reality 
Within the observed typologies or varieties of capitalism, Australia is classified as a ‘liberal 
market-based economy’, falling in a ‘highly homogenous Anglophone cluster’ of the US, UK, 
Canada and New Zealand (Amable 2003; Crouch 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001) given a high 
reliance on market mechanisms for coordination of the economy. This reliance is evidenced if 
we consider Australia’s mode of régulation which governs, guides, supports and secures the 
process of accumulation. Five institutional (or structural) forms comprise the mode of 
régulation, the dimensions of which are defined by: wage-labour’s relationship with capital; 
monetary and credit relationships; the competitive relations between firms; the nature of 
international relationships and arrangements; and finally, the form of state intervention 
including economic policy.  
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Box 1 presents a generalised synthesis of the contemporary Australian mode of 
régulation compared to that which prevailed during the previous Keynesian-Fordist golden 
age. It is apparent from these generalised descriptions that the overall organising principle of 
each institutional form has become, during the contemporary period, one of market logic 
heavily directed and supported by strong regulatory interventions by the state. The nature and 
extent of the Australian state’s interventions are far different from those during the period 
immediately following the Second World War until the 1980s.  
 















Centralised wage fixation system, wage 
growth tied to consumer prices, strong 
collective organisation of labour and 
prominent bargaining role, expansion of 
welfare system and social wage. 
 
Heavily regulated decentralised wage-
bargaining, increasing dominance of 
individual employment contracts, labour 
market segmentation into highly-paid 
skilled jobs and casual/part-time 
unskilled, lower-wage jobs, increasing 
private provision of social wage elements, 





New credit forms, housing interest rates 
capped, central bank controls over the 
banking system, foreign exchange 
controls. 
 
Policy and operational independence of 
central bank, monetary policy used to 
fight inflation and scrutiny by financial 
market, companies run by financial logic, 





Oligopoly and high levels of industry 
concentration protected by tariffs, 
legislative focus on anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
 
Legislative restriction of concentration, 






Multi-lateral agreements, growing 
internationalisation of financial markets, 
‘pegged’ exchange rate. 
 
Adhesion to free trade principles, 
increasing global integration through 
trade, finance and investment promoted 
by international alliances such as WTO, 
OECD, APEC and FTAs. 
 
Form of the 
state 
 
Keynesian welfare state, public 
expenditure directed to full employment 
objective, indirect intervention in 




Pursuit of structural competitiveness by 
proactive and market-enhancing state, 
fiscal policy pro-cyclical until late 2008, 
new forms of regulatory intervention 
using a range of agencies. 
Source: Chester (2008b) 
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There has been a marked shift in all institutional forms, comprising Australia’s mode of 
régulation, since the 1980s (Chester 2008b). A major influence has been increasing global 
integration driven by an Australian state which has actively embraced the notions of free trade 
and the removal of constraints on capital flows through bilateral trading agreements, other 
international alliances and a raft of economic policy decisions. Competition has been 
promoted strongly by the state through new national regulatory regimes (the nearly-decade 
long National Competition Policy and its successor, the National Reform Agenda), new sector-
specific regulation (for example, energy), one of the world’s largest privatisation programs, 
and contracting-out - via competitive tendering - of services previously provided direct by 
government.  
Other significant institutional changes to Australia’s mode of régulation, since the early 
1980s, have been: 
 financial deregulation, the abandonment of monetary targeting, and central bank targeting 
of inflation;  
 the introduction of a consumption tax, cuts in taxation rates favouring capital and taxation 
concessions increasingly used to ‘encourage’ individual provision of services such as health 
insurance and superannuation; 
 six Accords with the trade union movement, national wage increases abandoned, 
centralised wage determination replaced by heavily regulated workplace bargaining, and 
real expenditure on the social wage reallocated to other functions of government; and 
 eleven substantial Federal Budget surpluses in the 12 years ending 2008 with budgetary 
expenditure following a pro-cyclical pattern, and public debt virtually eliminated until the 
economic stimulus packages following the recent global financial crisis (ibid). 
Although the ‘glorification’ of markets has been pushed to new extremes, the form of 
competition remains characterised by monopoly or oligopoly with firms more intent on 
controlling the market than participating in an ideal pure form. The monetary and financial 
regime, and particularly the central bank’s interest rate policy, is closely scrutinised by 
international financial markets. Monetary (interest rate) policy has become autonomous of 
fiscal policy with the exchange rate determined by financial markets. 
Moreover, the progressive and cumulative impact of these institutional changes, these 
interventions by the state, has resulted in a particular configuration of the Australian mode of 
régulation’s institutional architecture. Yet these interventions – by the state at both macro and 
micro levels - are paradoxical given the prevailing economic and political ideology of neo-
liberalism that promotes deregulation, much less intervention by the state, and the triumph of 
‘free’ markets. This disjuncture between neoliberalism’s free market rhetoric and actual 
outcomes is immediately apparent from the comparison shown in Box 2. 
Neoliberalism’s free market rhetoric has pervaded the lexicon of Australian public 
policy as a vast array of policies have been transformed by market-inspired mechanisms based 
on economic concepts derived from the logic of perfect competitive markets. Examples include 
the charging of fees for time spent in immigration detention centres, contracting out of 
services delivered to the unemployed through competitive tendering, the charging of market 
rents to public housing tenants, the removal of barriers to free trade such as tariffs and import 
quotas, the provision of infrastructure through commercial contracts with the private sector, 
the creation of regulatory agencies to monitor competition, the development of accounting 
rules to measure greenhouse gas emissions, and student fees set at levels equivalent to the 
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costs of providing higher education places. This progressive widespread adoption of market-
based policy instruments has meant substantial change to markets which have traditionally 
supplied public goods such as electricity, water, education, health insurance, public housing, 
infrastructure, and services for the disabled, aged and unemployed. Most noticeably direct 
provision by government of these goods and services has been supplanted and there have 
been significant pricing changes. 
 










Deregulation and flexible labour 
markets will ensure full 
employment 
Highly-regulated decentralised 
wage determination system; 
persistent unemployment and 
labour under-utilisation 
 
Money and finance 
 
Interest rates set by market; 
price stability possible without 
adverse impact on employment; 
better service levels and reduced 




Price stability (inflation target of 
2-3% p.a.) but persistent 
unemployment and labour 
under-utilisation; increased 
range and level of charges; 





Deregulation will increase 
competition by entry of new 
firms; greater growth, efficiency 




Increasing market concentration 
in all sectors and oligopolies 
dominant; increasing regulation 
of economic activity to make it 
‘competitive’; infrastructure and 




Smooth currency adjustments; 
autonomy of national economic 
policies 
 
Volatile exchange rate 
movements; national economic 
policies shaped by needs of TNCs 
(espec resources sector) and key 
trading partners (China, India, 
US) 
 
Form of the state 
 
Minimal intervention will 
enhance growth and 
productivity 
 
Little public investment in social 
and economic infrastructure; 
falling productivity; new forms 
of social regulation (income 
management; intervention in 
indigenous communities); recent 
stimulus packages reversing 
budget surplus to deficit equal 
to  4.5% GDP 
 
The rationale for these market-based policies has been couched in terms of the need 
for greater economic efficiency.  Consequently contemporary Australian public policies are 
almost exclusively framed in abstract terms of competition, efficiency, supply and demand, or 
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the need to address market failures. More importantly, how are these markets structured and 
organised to ‘deliver’ these objectives of competition and efficiency, and address market 
failure? Is there a disjuncture, similar to that observed with Australia’s mode of régulation, 
between free market rhetoric and the operation, structure and outcomes of real world 
markets driven by ‘free market’ imbued policies? To answer these questions an empirical 
analysis was undertaken, the results of which are presented in the next section. 
 
3 Actually existing markets 
 
Five markets were analysed, four of which are longstanding markets previously providing 
goods and services directly and solely by government (electricity, water, housing for low-
income Australians, and services for the unemployed) and the other is a market currently 
being established (carbon trading). All five markets have, or will have, a widespread impact 
across the Australian community.  
The analytical framework used was that developed by Chester (2009). This framework, 
or analytical grid, poses a series of questions to explain the structure, operation, participants, 
behaviours, rules, and price setting which provides a realistic explanation of real world 
markets. The questions are: 
 What is the commodity ‘bought and sold’? How are these goods or services defined? To 
what extent have these definitions changed with the “virtual canonization of market 
organisation” (Nelson 2005: 1)? 
 Who are the market participants (individuals, groups or organisations)? Who transacts 
with who? Are intermediaries involved? 
 What are ‘rules’ or protocols which determine eligibility or ineligibility for ongoing access 
to a market? Are there legal and political decisions, or compromises, which determine 
who participates? 
 How does the interaction between ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ take place? Are particular 
behaviours forbidden? Are there implicit rules influencing the behaviour of market 
participants? 
 Is there a physical or virtual market location and how is this organised? Is the sphere of 
interaction local or global 
 What are the institutions, organisations, legislation or associations that organise the 
functioning of a market, as well as their responsibilities and enforcement tools to ‘make 
the market work’? 
 How is price determined? Are prices set outside or in the market? If it is a price-setting 
market, does this lead to different bilateral prices? 
 What is the form of competition in each market in light of the number of traders, 
distribution of ownership and market power? 
 What information is available to whom? Where is it available? What skills are needed to 
access or process market information? 
 What is the role of the state? 
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  Set out below is a broad overview of the development and operation of each market 
selected for analysis. This description is not definitive but establishes the context for the 
subsequent detailed comparison of the five markets’ structural features, interactions and 
outcomes. The descriptions and comparison seek to answer each of the above questions with 
respect to each market analysed. 
  
3.1 Electricity 
The Australian electricity sector of the early 1990s is unrecognisable today. Former 
government businesses have been broken up into multiple single function companies, with the 
functions of generation and retail exposed to competition and the natural monopoly functions 
of transmission and distribution regulated to support competition. Some of these companies 
have been privatised. The majority of consumers can choose their electricity supplier following 
the progressive introduction of retail competition. A wholesale National Electricity Market 
(NEM) has been created through which the vast majority of electricity generated and 
consumed in Australia is traded.1 A parallel electricity derivatives market also has been created 
to manage wholesale price risk. Regulation of transmission and distribution has been 
transferred from State governments to Federal regulators. A core feature of the electricity 
sector’s restructuring has been to place far greater reliance on the market to determine pricing 
and investment outcomes.  
 Thirty-four government electricity companies existed in 1990. By November 2009, the 
NEM had 139 registered participants compared to 77 when the market commenced in late 
1998 (AEMO 2009b; NEMMCO 1999). Across the NEM, private ownership accounts for around 
30 per cent of generation and transmission capacities respectively, 52 per cent of services to 
distribution customers and more than 60 per cent of services to retail customers (Chester, 
2007). Offshore transnationals dominate private ownership.  
The Australian Energy Market Commission and the Australian Energy Regulator are 
responsible for the oversight and regulation of the NEM. The National Electricity Rules (Rules) 
prescribe the NEM’s day-to-day operation. The Rules prescribe six types of market participant 
(e.g. generator, customer, network service provider, trader), the process to achieve registered 
participant status and the terms under which each will engage in the market.  All market 
participants must comply with a prescribed prudential framework administered by the 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEM). The “stability and financial integrity of the NEM is 
underpinned” (NEMMCO 2003: 12) by this framework and, in conjunction with derivatives, 
ensures the “efficient management of financial risk for parties trading in the NEM” (ibid: 3).  
The Rules are structured around a mandatory requirement that each generator, with a 
capacity greater than 30 Megawatts (MW), must sell all electricity produced through the NEM. 
The Rules also require the market and system operator – the Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) - to monitor demand, forecast supply capacity and operate a centralised 
process whereby generating units are scheduled and dispatched into production to ensure 
instantaneous matching of supply and demand. The dispatch process is driven by generators’ 
bids to produce a volume at particular prices. Bids are ‘stacked’ in order of ascending price as 
                                                          
1
 The NEM covers southern and eastern Australia (Queensland, NSW, ACT, Victoria, Tasmania and South 
Australia). The geographic remoteness of the population centres of WA and the NT make the cost of 
transmission interconnection to a national grid prohibitive. Restructuring of the WA electricity sector 
has essentially mirrored that involving the NEM. 
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the AEMO matches the generating capacity declared available against forecast demand. As 
demand increases, the more costly bids are scheduled into production.  
The Rules also set out the process to determine the wholesale price. First, the price for 
each five minute dispatch interval is derived. This is usually the highest bid generator brought 
into production to meet demand. Second, a time-weighted average is calculated of the six 
dispatch prices for each half hour trading interval for each NEM region. There is no single NEM 
wholesale price. The Rules also specify the maximum price which generators may bid.2   
The level of wholesale prices - particularly, its volatility or spikes - is claimed to signal 
the need for investment in additional generation capacity (COAG Energy Market Review 2002; 
NSW Government 2004). “As the capacity of available generation to meet demand diminishes, 
relative scarcity will lead to an increase in the spot price, and new generation or network 
capacity will be attracted into the market” (AEMO 2009: 7). Price volatility within the NEM has 
been widely acknowledged but spikes have regularly occurred at levels well below maximum 
demand and have not stimulated investment in baseload capacity (Chester 2008a). The 
increase in NEM generating capacity has been dominated by peaking capacity with marginal 
additions to baseload through augmentation of existing plant. Moreover, uncertainty about 
carbon trading (which we discuss shortly), and climate change policies more generally, has 
been cited as a serious impediment to generation investment (Productivity Commission 2005). 
Consequently the adequacy of Australia’s capacity to meet forecast long-term demand for 
electricity is under threat (Chester 2008c).  
Retail (end-use) prices for households have shown significant increases. Contrary to 
the policy rhetoric, the vast majority of Australian households have not changed electricity 
supplier and the price of their electricity is set by regulation. The charges comprising regulated 
household electricity prices are set by a combination of Federal and State-by-State regulation. 
Not only is the charge-setting process complex, multiple tariffs contribute to each of the basic 
charges and these can vary considerably between urban, regional and rural locations as well as 
States and Territories. Periodic review of these charges has led to significant price increases in 
all States and Territories. All Australian governments have agreed to phase out this form of 
price regulation subject to evidence of effective competition (Victoria led the way from 1 
January 2009) which means that electricity suppliers will set the end-use prices paid by 
households (Chester 2007; COAG 2006).  
Market power and ownership concentration are also present in the NEM. The National 
Electricity Rules permit re-bidding by generators which has resulted in the generators wielding 
considerable market power (Chester 2006, 2007, 2008a). Although the number of sellers 
(generators) has increased considerably, a small number of companies dominate generation 
capacity in each NEM region. Three private companies hold ownership interests for around 80 
per cent of Victorian capacity and two of these owners dominate South Australian generation 
capacity. Government ownership accounts for at least two-thirds of total NEM generation 
capacity (Chester 2006, 2008a). Two strong trends driving a more concentrated market 
structure have been consolidation within the retail sub-sector and re-integration of generation 
with retail activities (Chester 2007). 
 
                                                          
2
  At the commencement of the NEM in late 1998, the maximum wholesale price was set at A$5000 per 
MWh, increased to its current level of A$10,000 per MWh in April 2002 and will increase to $12,500 per 
MWh from June 2010.  
 




Traditionally water and wastewater services have been provided by government-owned 
monopoly providers managing all aspects of the water supply chain from dams to taps, and 
from sewers to treatment plants and disposal. These services currently operate under a mix of 
industry structures including: vertically-integrated government-owned suppliers for an entire 
State or region (e.g. South Australia and Western Australia); separation of the bulk harvesting 
and supply functions from distribution and retail (e.g. Sydney and Melbourne); and, urban 
water provision by local government (e.g. Queensland, Tasmania and regional NSW) (Frontier 
Economics 2008).   
 This range of industry arrangements is marked by four aspects. First, government 
authorities predominate with private sector involvement skewed towards capital construction 
(and possibly operation and maintenance, through public-private partnerships (PPPs)) and the 
provision of inputs through competitive procurement practices by government providers. 
Second, there is very little direct competition in the supply of water and wastewater services 
with customers being supplied by a monopoly provider. Third, market-based mechanisms have 
been progressively – but not universally - implemented across this sector e.g. full cost recovery 
pricing, separation of policy and regulatory functions from actual service delivery, licensing of 
providers. Fourth, water trading arrangements have become increasingly prevalent in the 
Australian rural water market (Australian Government 2006; ibid). 
A market for Australian water trading was initiated with the 1994 Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) decision to implement a system of water allocations or entitlements 
supported by the separation of water property rights from land title, and specification of 
entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and quality (COAG 
1994).  The same meeting also agreed for water pricing to be based on usage charges, full-cost 
recovery, the reduction or elimination of cross-subsidies, and the adoption of an access or 
connection charge – in addition to usage charges - for all urban water users.  
These decisions, taken in the context of COAG’s agreement to the National 
Competition Policy from the mid 1990s, also saw commitments to separate water resource 
management policy responsibility, standard setting, regulatory enforcement and service 
provision from those agencies which actually delivered and sold water. This led to the 
corporatisation of government-owned water utilities and a more commercial focus across the 
water sector (Australian Government 2006).  
 Two kinds of water trading markets have developed in Australia – temporary (i.e. 
seasonal water allocations) and permanent (i.e. access entitlements). Market participants 
exchange their allocations or entitlements i.e. there is an exchange of water rights at an 
agreed ‘market-clearing’ price (Silby 2008). The use of the temporary (allocation) market has 
been the most significant in Australia to date facilitated by the emergence of water exchanges 
particularly in Victoria and NSW (Bjornlund 2004).  Temporary trades between individual water 
users when water availability is low have accounted for the major part of activity, especially in 
the southern Murray-Darling Basin (ACIL Tasman 2003; Crase, O’Keefe et al 2008).  
 In Australia, the overarching right to the flow, use and control of water is vested in the 
States. Water is defined in State-based legislation generally as that found in naturally occurring 
watercourses and aquifers. Each State jurisdiction has its own water management planning 
processes and policies, as well as the means to confer rights to water to other parties and the 
environment. In addition, there have been a range of decisions by the COAG about water 
resource management. Consequently water market transactions are governed by policy, 
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legislative and institutional frameworks at the national, state and local levels which encompass 
the types of transactions permitted, the products to be traded, and trading rules (ibid).  
Water trading is important because it allows scarce water resources to be transferred to their 
most productive uses ... Creating an environment in which individual water access entitlement 
holders are able to trade water quickly and easily will contribute to a more productive and 
efficient use of Australia’s water over time (National Water Commission 2009).  
These notions underpin the development of Australian water trading and the successive 
decisions of the COAG to develop Australia’s water markets. However, as prolonged drought 
has exacerbated water supplies, the ability of rural and urban water markets to meet these 
objectives is being thwarted. As a result, the COAG has agreed new arrangements for the 
Murray-Darling Basin, the producer of one third of Australia’s food supply, including Federal 
Government buyback of water entitlements and new regulatory arrangements (COAG 2008). 
In urban water markets, supply shortages have led to significant, long-term restrictions on use, 
subsidies for ‘water-efficient’ appliances and installation of rainwater tanks, extensive 
government information campaigns, and the increased application of ‘scarcity’ pricing. 
Governments around Australia have also embarked on the construction, through PPPs, of 
energy-intensive desalination plants to augment supply.  
 But these measures overshadow the features sharply delineating Australia’s 
contemporary urban and rural water markets – increasing access and usage charges for urban 
users; a myriad of complex regulatory and licensing arrangements; uncertainty amongst 
participants about future supply; poorly defined, and jurisdictionally inconsistent, property 
rights to access and entitlement; and increasingly direct intervention by the Federal 
Government (ACIL Tasman 2003; Bjornlund 2004; National Water Commission 2008). 
 
3.3 Employment services for the unemployed 
The genesis of a competitive market for employment services to the unemployed was the 
Federal Labor Government’s 1994 Working Nation, a package of policies to promote economic 
growth and employment (Australian Government 1994). These policies included individualised 
case management for the long-term or disadvantaged unemployed “to identify the most 
suitable path to augment a client’s employability” (O’Neill 1999: 8). A competitive tender for 
contracted case management, on a fixed-price basis, resulted in the single public sector 
provider, the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), competing to deliver this service with 
a range of private and not-for-profit providers. In addition, the CES contracted a range of 
agencies to provide, for a fee, job or training experience for the unemployed.  
This progressive shift towards private sector provision of services to the unemployed 
accelerated in 1998 when the CES - which had existed since 1946 - was effectively abolished to 
be replaced by a national network of employment service providers. The Federal Government 
became a “purchaser of employment services” (ibid). Contracts established a schedule of fees 
for job matching, job search training and intensive assistance services. 
Job Network, as this provision of services to the unemployed was labelled, created a 
national network of organisations (private, community and some formerly, government) 
contracted by the Federal Government through a competitive tender process.3  Initial 
contracts (1998-2000, 2000-03) were awarded on the basis of price and quality. Later contracts 
                                                          
3
 For the purposes of the tender, Australia is divided into labour market regions and providers are 
requested to tender for the required services specified for each region. 
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(2003-08) were awarded on the basis of ‘quality’, a performance rating model assessed by the 
Federal Government, with fixed floor prices for each service (Thomas 2007). Eardley (2003: 32) 
observed that, with the third round of contracts, the Job Network had become a 
concentration of the key employment services, both in terms of the number of agencies and 
the number of sites ... Public sector involvement is reduced to a few local or State government 
projects, while the private agencies and non-profit sector have consolidated their roughly equal 
market share. 
In 2009, Job Network morphed into Job Services Australia which is in essence the same network 
of contracted employment services to be provided by the private and not-for-profit sectors. 
However, all those unemployed – not just the long-term unemployed or most disadvantaged 
jobseekers – are eligible to access these services and two overseas providers, of 114 in total, 
are now part of the network to deliver employment services (O’Connor 2009). 
This reconfiguration of employment services provision, under the guise of competition, 
efficiency, rewards for outcomes and ‘some’ consumer choice (Productivity Commission 2002), 
has been described as a ‘managed’ or ‘quasi’ market, akin to that defined by Le Grand and 
Bartlett (1993). Previously this market had a single public sector supplier, the CES. Now the 
Federal Government purchases, by contract, the specified employment services from multiple 
non-government suppliers – one buyer, multiple sellers. The Federal Government also 
regulates this market through contract performance review.  
The Federal Government, as sole buyer, purchases on behalf of multiple recipients of 
these services - the unemployed – but mandates certain behaviours as criteria to access these 
services. Those receiving unemployment benefits are eligible to access employment services.4  
To continue receiving unemployment benefits, there are mandatory activity test or 
participation requirements including attendance at all job interviews, acceptance of ‘suitable’ 
job offers, evidence of searching for ‘suitable paid work’, and not exiting training or a job 
without valid reason (Centrelink 2009). Ongoing compliance with these requirements is a 
condition of payment. Once registered for unemployment benefits, you are then permitted to 
register online with an employment services provider. A considerable amount of the 
unemployed’s interaction with Centrelink – the public sector organisation responsible for the 
delivery of welfare payments – and employment service providers is via the internet. Apart 
from the need for computer access, this interaction requires levels of literacy, numeracy and 
computer skills so that the unemployed can ‘navigate’ their way through this market, make 
informed choices about service providers, search for work, and comply with mandatory 
reporting requirements.  
 Outcomes of this market have been found to be ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ of job seekers 
arising from a performance-linked payment structure. Those requiring more intensive 
assistance are ‘parked’ while those job seekers with greater changes of achieving payable 
outcomes are targeted  or ‘creamed’ (Cowling and Mitchell 2002; Productivity Commission 
2002). The market has also been found to be less costly than its predecessor with a range of 
innovations in service delivery but “agencies (are) vulnerable to acceptance of downward 
pressure from employers on the quality and conditions of work offered, and makes it hard to 
resist some employers’ discriminatory practices” (Eardley, Abello et al 2001: 62). Those with 
minimal barriers to employment need little or no assistance from this market because they 
find work readily but there have far more limited outcomes for the longer term and more 
                                                          
4
 Not all those unemployed receive unemployment benefits. The income support payments which fall 
within the category of unemployment benefits are Newstart Allowance, Youth Allowance, Parenting 
Payment and Special Benefit which have participation or activity test requirements.  
 
Society of Heterodox Economists, December 2009 
 
138 
difficult-to-place job seekers particularly as substantial administrative and compliance 
demands have been imposed upon contracted providers (Thomas 2007). 
 
3.4 Housing for low-income Australians 
Housing for 19 per cent of Australian households is provided by the private rental market and 
a further five per cent rely on public and community housing (Productivity Commission 2009: 
16A.72). Housing stress, where 30 per cent or more of gross income is committed to housing 
costs, is severest for renting households. Yates (2008) estimates that the incidence of housing 
stress had risen to 65 per cent for lower income private renters in 2002-03.5 It has also been 
found that the persistence of housing stress is highest amongst this group (Marks and 
Sedgwick 2008). The private and public markets for low-cost rental housing, since the mid 
1990s, have been significantly impacted by demand-side and supply-side measures provided 
by government. 
In 1945 the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement (CSHA) was conceived to 
construct new rental dwellings to deal with the post war housing shortage. The 1973 CSHA 
introduced targeting of assistance to low income earners which accelerated from the mid 
1990s. The 1996 CSHA emphasised housing outcomes for individuals rather than increasing 
stock, tighter targeting of stock allocation (to those on the lowest incomes) and removed any 
requirement for funds to be used to create new stock. Subsequent CSHAs reinforced this 
direction (McIntosh 1997, 2000; McIntosh and Phillips 2001).6  The total stock of public and 
community housing has declined since the mid 1990s coinciding with tighter targeting to  
those in greatest need, a real terms decline in Federal funding of 24 per cent from 1998-99 to 
2007-08, and greater reliance being placed on the private rental market (Productivity 
Commission 2009).  
Eligibility criteria for access to public housing varies across each State and Territory 
jurisdiction in terms of income and asset limits, residency requirements, waiting list 
segmentation (and lengthening), periodic reviews of eligibility and rent rebates (ibid: 16.6). All 
housing authorities apply rent affordability benchmarks of around 25 per cent of assessable 
income i.e. a rebate on market rent. In 2007-08, 88 per cent of public housing tenants paid less 
than market rent (ibid: 16A.1).  
 Rent assistance, a ‘demand-side’ form of housing assistance, is provided by the Federal 
Government to those renting in the private housing market and who receive income support 
payments, or those not receiving income support but who receive the base level of designated 
family payments (DFHCSIA 2009a). Rent assistance, indexed twice yearly by the CPI, is paid 
according to minimum thresholds and maximum rates which vary according to household type 
and number of dependents. There is no affordability benchmark like for public housing tenants 
and no differentiation between rural and urban rental markets. Without rent assistance, it has 
been estimated that nearly 27 per cent of recipients in 2008 would have spent more than 50 
per cent of their gross income on rent (Productivity Commission 2009: 16.82). 
                                                          
5
 Marks and Segdwick (2008) estimated 40 per cent of households in the lowest quartile of equivalised 
disposable income were in housing stress in 2006. Yates’ estimate is for the lowest 2 quintiles of 
equivalised disposable household income. 
6
 Traditionally the Federal Government provided about two-thirds of total CSHA funding with the 
remainder from the States and Territories. About three-quarters of Federal funds was for public housing 
with the remainder to aboriginal rental housing, crisis accommodation and community housing. 
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In 2007-08 expenditure on rent assistance reached $2.3 billion for nearly 950,000 
recipients (compared to $1.3 billion by all Australian governments for around 377,000 public 
and community housing tenants). Expenditure on rent assistance has escalated while funding 
of public housing has fallen (Productivity Commission 2009). This significant shift away from 
supply-side to demand-side measures is predicated on three notions: that low income is the 
primary reason for housing (un)affordability; that increased income will mean greater private 
rental choices for low-income households; and the private rental market will supply affordable 
and appropriate housing at the price demanded by low-income households. However, the 
private rental housing market has ‘failed’ given the ongoing shortage of low cost private rental 
dwellings (Berry 2003; Yates and Wulff 2000, 2005).   
 Since mid 2008, the Federal Government has announced three measures intended to 
stimulate the supply of low-cost rental housing:  
 the National Affordable Housing Agreement, a ‘rebadged’ CSHA, continues the established 
base funding for public housing and indigenous, community and crisis housing with 
marginal increases in funding;  
 the National Rental Affordability Scheme, directed at large-scale development, is intended 
to supply 50,000 low-cost rental dwellings by 2012. Financial incentives are provided, to 
eligible investors, for 10 years subject to the dwellings being rented at 20 per cent below 
market rate to tenants whose eligibility is assessed against an income cap; 7 and 
 the Social Housing Initiative, announced as part of the Federal Government’s ‘Nation 
Building – Economic Stimulus Plan’, is intended to increase, by mid 2012, the stock of 
social housing dwellings by 20,000 and refurbish 47,000 existing public and community 
housing dwellings (DFHCSIA 2009c).  
These additions to the low-cost rental housing market will take some time to materialise but, if 
successful, represent barely a third of that required for the 215,000 applicants on the waiting 
list for public and community housing at 30 June 2008 (Productivity Commission 2009). 
 
3.5 Carbon trading 
The Federal Government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) is an exemplar with few 
parallels or precedents of a market-based policy solution which impacts on each and every 
Australian. The scheme is scheduled to start from 1 July 2011.  It is a cap-and-trade scheme 
whereby the Government will set an annual limit (cap) on the total amount of carbon 
emissions permitted. Annual scheme caps will be announced five years in advance. Permits, 
that represent a right to emit a specific amount of carbon, will be issued by the Government 
and traded at auction. The total amount of emissions covered by the permits issued will equal 
the government-set cap. 
 Details of the scheme were released in late 2008 (Australian Government 2008a) with 
amendments, particularly to transitional arrangements, subsequently announced following 
heavy lobbying by business and negotiations between the major political parties. The CPRS will 
cover stationary energy (including electricity generation), transport, industrial processes, 
                                                          
7
 The Federal Government provides $6000 per dwelling per year as a refundable tax offset or payment. 
State and Territory governments provide $2000 per dwelling per year as a payment or in-kind financial 
support. Applicants must meet criteria such as demonstrated capacity, financially viable proposal and 
demonstrated need for the proposal (DFHCSIA 2009b). 
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waste, and fugitive emissions from oil and gas. The emissions from these activities represent 
about 75 per cent of Australia’s total emissions and involve around 1000 entities. 
Entities within Australia that emit carbon to do business will be required to buy 
permits (or may be allocated free permits). Monthly auctions of permits, for the current year 
and up to three years in advance, will be held. An ascending clock auction is proposed whereby 
the price will rise until the number of units demanded by bidders matches the number for 
sale.8 However, the Federal Government has announced that a fixed price of $10 per tonne of 
CO2 will apply for the first year of the scheme. 
One permit will provide an entity with the right to emit one tonne of CO2 or its 
equivalent. The newly created Australian Climate Change Regulatory Authority (ACCRA) will 
conduct the permit auctions and determine the eligibility of businesses to buy permits based 
on emissions data provided under the mandatory National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
(NGER). Reporting under the NGER is triggered if a business or facility surpasses the minimum-
specified thresholds for the production of direct greenhouse gas emissions, energy production 
or energy consumption. Criminal and civil penalties are proposed for non-compliance and large 
emitters will be regularly audited by ACCRA. 
Businesses will be required to surrender a permit (irrespective of whether bought at 
auction or administratively allocated) to ACCRA, at the end of each compliance period, for 
every tonne of emissions which they produce.  Businesses can trade permits between 
themselves, can ‘bank’ them and some borrowing of future permits will be allowed.  In 
addition, the market will allow permits to be bought and sold internationally. 
The key transition measures, to apply for at least the first ten years of the CPRS, are: 
 Assistance to ‘emissions-intensive-trade-exposed’ (EITE), to avoid ‘loss of competitiveness, 
in the form of free permits.9 ACCRA will assess if activity meets EITE eligibility criteria and 
the rate of assistance (most exposed activities will get up to 95 per cent of permits free). 
This assistance will be reviewed every five years with a five-year notice period of changes; 
 Assistance to coal-fired electricity generation which provides around 75 per cent of 
domestic electricity production and contributes some 35 per cent to Australia’s emissions. 
Free permits will be provided to generators for ten years subject to capacity being 
maintained and a ‘windfall gain’ review; and 
 Compensation to households for higher energy prices will be provided through an increase 
in payments for those receiving income support payments and Family Tax Benefit. In 
addition the excise tax on fuel will be reduced by one cent for every commensurate rise 
due to pass through of the cost of carbon trading.   
This broad-brush sketch of the CPRS, and its key transition measures, illustrates this 
new market’s complexity underpinned by a very substantive administrative, legislative and 
regulatory regime. Considerable doubt has been cast on the scheme’s efficacy to reduce 
emissions given the government’s forecasts assume no change to the contribution of coal-fired 
capacity to electricity generation before 2033 (Australian Government 2008b: 33). Other 
expected outcomes are: household energy expenditure to rise, on average, from $6-7 or up to 
$12 per week (Australian Government 2008b, 2009c); a direct budgetary cost of more than $8 
billion over 10 years (Australian Government 2009a, 2009b); TNC owners of EITE activities and 
                                                          
8
 Auction rules, procedures and payment arrangements are still being designed. 
9
 Examples of EITE activities expected to receive assistance are aluminium smelting, integrated iron and 
steel manufacturing, petroleum refining and LNG production. 
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coal-fired electricity generators to gain considerably given current ownership patterns 
(Innovest 2008); and, the potential for large price swings (Metcalfe 2009: 15). These sort of 
prospective outcomes reinforce the “messy, highly politicised material reality of such markets” 
(MacKenzie 2007: 17). 
 
Box 3 compares the key structural features, interactions and outcomes of the five 
markets described above from which we reach some conclusions about actually existing 
markets via-à-vis the abstract notion of markets provided by mainstream neoclassical 
economics which has smothered Australian public policy. 
 
4 Implications of market-based public policies 
 
Markets are not purely about relationships between inanimate objects, between goods and 
services, which is the strong impression evoked by any mainstream economics text or 
government publication. Markets involve people, their preferences (which cannot be isolated 
from opinions, values and the influence of advertising) and relationships with others. Market 
prices also will influence people’s accessibility to, and participation in, a market. Markets, 
shaped by public policies, determine – to a significant measure - the health, standard of living 
and social inclusion of the population. 
 The preceding analysis and comparison of five contemporary Australian markets 
allows a number of conclusions to be readily drawn.  
First, eligibility to participate in a market, by both buyers and sellers, requires pre-
determined criteria – usually set by regulators - to be met. These criteria are not static, can be 
quite complex and may involve a cost or ‘entry fee’ (e.g. water connection fee), assessment by 
a regulator (e.g. competitive tender, data provided by participant) or eligibility to be 
established first by another market (e.g. welfare recipients). Payment of the price of a good or 
service, traded in a market, does not determine eligibility to be a market participant. 
Second, ongoing market participation is not assured even if eligibility criteria are 
satisfied. Participants may be required to make a regular payment (e.g. annual NEM fees), be 
limited to a fixed term by contract, be subject to regular re-assessment of eligibility, or make 
payment for goods and services by supplier-determined time and method. Payment of the 
price of a good or service is insufficient for buyers to maintain ongoing market access. 
Third, government policy measures directly impact on the demand and supply of the 
goods and services sold in each of the markets analysed and hence, the interventions of 
government are directly determining market outcomes not relative prices.  
Fourth, regulators actively determine prices in each of the five markets analysed. Price 
is not being determined by the ‘forces of supply and demand’. The water trading market was 
the only market found to have price agreed by buyer and seller but heavily determined by the 
extent to which property rights are specified. 
Fifth, intermediaries are evident in many markets, most commonly as market 
operators.  
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Box 3: Comparison of the structural features, interactions and outcomes of five Australian markets   
 
 
Electricity Water Employment services 
for the unemployed 10 
Housing for the low-
income  
Carbon trading 





Low-cost housing in 
private and public 
markets 
 
Permit to pollute 





Public Private Mixed Public 




households  connected 




households connected to 
water supply system 
Federal Government on 
behalf of those receiving 
unemployment benefits  
Those receiving income 
support payments and 
base level family 
assistance 
1000 entities assessed to 
be largest emitters  
How do buyers (end-
users) maintain market 
access? 
Pay connection fee plus 
access and usage 
charges by supplier-
determined time and 
method 
 
Pay usage and access 
charges by supplier-
determined time and 
method. Pay agreed 
price for exchange of 
water rights 
Retain eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, 
meet reporting 
obligations and register 
with Job Services 
Australia 
 
Retain eligibility for 
income support, and 
base level family 
assistance. Meet 
thresholds for rent 
assistance and eligibility 
for public housing 
Eligible to buy permits 
based on annual 
regulator assessment of 
emissions from company 
supplied data 
  
Who are the eligible 
sellers and how do they 
maintain market access? 
NEM participants must 
register,  meet/maintain 
strict prudential criteria 
and pay annual fees. 
Retail companies must 
be licenced by State 
government regulators 
to operate in respective 
State and local 
government authorities. 




Providers contracted for 
fixed 3-year term  
State government 
authorities provide 
public housing stock. 
Federal Government 
provides rent assistance 
payments and incentives 
to stimulate construction 
of new rental stock. 
Government will auction 
permits  
                                                          
10
 Although there is marginal difference with Job Network, the arrangements described reflect those as at 2009 following the introduction of Job Services Australia. 
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Box 3: Comparison of the structural features, interactions and outcomes of five Australian markets   
 
 
Electricity Water Employment services 
for the unemployed 10 





Private sector must meet 






NEM allows for 
withdrawal or ‘load 
shifting’ by large market 
customers when 
wholesale price passes a 





Restrictions on use 




Subsidies to install 
water-efficient 
appliances. Application 
of  ‘scarcity’ pricing 
 
 Rent assistance for those 
in private rental market. 
Rent rebate for those in 
public housing. 
Transitional assistance 
for coal-fired electricity 
generation (free permit 
allocation) and EITE 
industries (partial free 
permit allocation) for at 
least 5 years. Tax 





Limited augmentation of 
govt-owned generation 
capacity. 10-year 
projections of adequacy 
of generation and 
transmission capacity to 




Limited measures to 
increase recycling. 
Trading of entitlements 
and allocations 
Competitive tender to 
provide services for a 
contracted period 
Provision of public 
housing stock. Funding 
of community housing. 
Tax rebates/subsidies to 
private sector to 
construct new rental 
dwellings for low-income 
Government sets up and 
maintains permit auction 
How is price 
determined? 
Half-hourly wholesale 
price set by market 
operator but capped at 
$10,000 per MWh  
Transmission and 
distribution:  regulated 
Retail: regulated for 
majority of households 
Urban: State regulators 
set access and usage 
charges in respective 
jurisdiction. 
Trading: price agreed 
through exchange 
Performance-linked 
payments set by 
Government as part of 
competitive tender. 
Rate of rent assistance 
(and eligibility) subject to 
annual Federal budget 
process. Rent rebate 




1st year fixed price  of 
$10 per tonne of CO2 
(set by government) 
then floating price.  
 
Society of Heterodox Economists, December 2009 
 
144 
Box 3: Comparison of the structural features, interactions and outcomes of five Australian markets   
 
 
Electricity Water Employment services 
for the unemployed 10 
Housing for the low-
income  
Carbon trading 
until evidence of 
‘effective competition’  
determined within 
Federal budget process. 
 
Does buyer (end-user) 
pay price?  
Yes. NEM customer pays 
price set by market 
operator. End-user pays 
price charged by retailer 
 
Yes. End-user pays price 
charged by supplier or 
established through 
trading 
Price paid by Federal 
Government on behalf of 
end-users, the 
unemployed 
No. Federal Government 
sets and pay all ‘prices’ 
of rent assistance, public 
housing stock and 
subsidies to private 
sector 
 
Yes. Permit buyer pays 
1
st
 year fixed price and 
then auction price 
How do buyers (end-
users) and sellers 
interact? 
NEM market operator 
acts as intermediary 
between generators and 
distributors. Direct 
retailer-consumer 
interface via internet, 
billing or phone. 
Urban: Direct retailer-
consumer interface via 
internet, billing or 
phone. 
Trading: through water 
exchanges 
Online tender process. 
Unemployed persons 
register online, meet 
with provider and 
maintain contact via 
internet and in-person 
meetings.  
 
Online or direct interface 




Arrangements for clock 
auction envisaged to be 
online (like electricity 
trading). 
What information is 
provided to buyers (end-
users)? 
NEM market operator: 
forecasts capacity and 
demand, NEM prices 
Retailers: consumer 
obligations, price, billing, 
payment terms 
Regulators: performance 






obligations and rights, 
price, billing, payment 
terms. 
Water brokers: price 
determination, rules for 
lodging offers, fees, 
trade eligibility, payment 
terms. 
Regulators: performance 
reports of regulated 
monopolies, rules for 
Details of tender and 
outcomes. Locations of 
providers and services. 
Obligations and 
reporting requirements 
if unemployed and 
penalties for breach 
Eligibility rules for rent 
assistance and scale of 
payments. Eligibility for 
public/community 
housing. Application 




Expected to include 
forward calendar of 
auction dates, rules for 
submitting/withdrawing 
bids, number of permits 
to be sold at each 
auction, past prices paid. 
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Box 3: Comparison of the structural features, interactions and outcomes of five Australian markets   
 
 
Electricity Water Employment services 
for the unemployed 10 
Housing for the low-
income  
Carbon trading 
water brokers, price 
determinations 
 
How is information 
provided to buyers (end-
users)? 
Retailers: websites, 
telephone, direct mail 
National and State 
Regulators: websites  
Retailers: websites, 
telephone, direct mail 
National and State 
regulators: websites 
Water Brokers: websites 
Government websites. 
Centrelink offices. Direct 
mail. 
Government websites. 
Centrelink offices. Direct 




What are the main 
features of the 
regulatory regime? 
National Electricity Rules 
(1251 pages). Australian 
Energy Market Operator. 
Australian Energy 
Regulator.  Australian 
Energy Market 
Commission 





Darling Basin Authority. 
COAG Agreements. 






Department of Family, 
Housing, Community 





Scheme. Social Housing 
Initiative. 
800-page White Paper. 




Authority.  Australian 
Carbon Trust. National 
Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting System. 
Assessment rules for 
EITE assistance. 
 
What is the extent of the 
market or form of 
competition? 
NEM: managed market 
Generation: oligopoly 
Transmission: monopoly 
in each State  
Distribution: monopoly 






Rural: contested market  
Contestable managed 
market. Providers 
dominated by handful of 
large private companies 
Public rental: monopoly 
Private rental: contested 
Managed market 
What is the role of NEM operator and Owner. Regulator. Buyer Regulator. Manager of Owner/manager public Market operator. Price 
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Box 3: Comparison of the structural features, interactions and outcomes of five Australian markets   
 
 
Electricity Water Employment services 
for the unemployed 10 
Housing for the low-
income  
Carbon trading 
government regulator. Price regulator 
for transmission, 
distribution and retail. 
Owner of substantial 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution and retail 
capacity. 
contested market. housing stock. Regulator 
of community housing. 
Cash provision of rent 
assistance.  Funding of 
new public housing 
stock. Provision of tax 
and financial incentives 
to stimulate construction 





 year price. 
Regulator (assessor of 
permit eligibility and EITE 
assistance; sets annual 
cap). Buyer through 
Australian Carbon Trust.  
What are the key market 
outcomes? 
Wholesale price volatility 
not reflecting demand or 
stimulating investment. 
Electricity derivatives 
market to manage 
wholesale price risk. 
Generators exercise 
market power. Retail 
consolidation.  Retail and 
generation re-
integrating. Significant 
price increases for 
households. Increasing 
customer complaints and 
disconnections. 
Generation capacity 
inadequate for forecast 
long-term demand 
Inconsistent definitions 
of property rights across 
Australia. Markedly 
higher charges paid by 
all water consumers. 
Desalination plants have 
required purpose-built 
energy capacity. Long-
term urban and rural 
supply capacity is under 
severe threat. Severe 
deterioration of Murray-
Darling Basin 
Less costly than previous 
sole provider provision. 






based payments have 
led to ‘parking’ and 
‘creaming’. Limited 
success for many long-
term or difficult-to-place 
job seekers. High 
reliance on unemployed 
having internet access 
and computer skills 
More than 50% of low-
income renting 
households in housing 
stress. Growing public 
housing waiting lists. 
Supply of public and 
private rental stock  not 
responding to chronic 
excess demand for cheap 
rental housing. Stimulus 
measures yet to 
generate forecast stock 
increases in low-cost 
rental housing which 
barely represent a third 
of waiting lists for public 
and community housing  
Complex scheme. Only 
75% emissions covered. 
Household energy costs 
to rise by $6-7/week. 
Compensation to income 
support recipients, 1 
year after market start. 
Reduction in fuel tax if 
fuel price increases. 
Coal-fired electricity 
generation emissions 
assumed not to fall 
before 2033. Budgetary 
cost of $4.8b. TNCs 
benefit most from free 
permit allocations and 
EITE assistance. Potential 
for large price swings 
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Sixth, the vast majority of interaction between market participants is via the internet 
requiring buyers to have computer access as well as literacy and numeracy skills. This may well 
pose barriers to full and ongoing participation. 
Seventh, quite complex and detailed information is available to buyers relating to their 
participation, obligations, payments terms, penalties and performance data about providers.  
However, the ability to access, and skills to process, this information will determine the extent 
to which buyers use this information to make ‘choices’. 
Eighth, each market is underpinned by a very complex evolving legislative and 
regulatory regime involving multiple institutions. 
Ninth, different types of market and extent of competition are evident such as 
contested, managed, monopoly franchise, and oligopoly. Imperfect competition was found 
only for the electricity retail market. 
Tenth, government is a very dominant participant in all markets, performing multiple 
roles as regulator, owner of significant supplier assets, manager of stock, manager of 
contested markets, market operator, and buyer. 
Eleventh, despite government demand-side and supply-side measures, and significant 
price increases in the majority of markets analysed, the key outcomes of each market show 
that supply is not meeting demand and one market (housing for low-income Australians) is 
evidence of chronic market failure. 
Twelfth, market power and concentration are strongly present in the majority of 
markets analysed.  
These conclusions confirm that the assumptions of the abstract market promulgated 
by neoclassical economics are incompatible with reality. Moreover, these conclusions provide 
strong affirmation the market is such a complex institution that it cannot be distilled or 
equated to the sum or aggregation of bilateral relationships which is the approach of 
neoclassical economics.  
The analysis has also clearly shown, contrary to the view promulgated by mainstream 
economics imbued in public policy, there is not one but a spectrum of contemporary market 
configurations and exceedingly complex governance regimes in which government plays a 
multiplicity of direct interventionist roles in actual existing markets. Thus, the organisation of a 
capitalist economy, such as Australia, which attributes a leading role to competitive markets, 
can only be explained by ascertaining: the institutions, legislation, organisations, or 
interactions that organise the functioning of various markets; the series of commodities for 
which the supply and demand of is heavily determined by market institutions, including 
regulation by the state; and the forms of competition according to the number of traders, 
ownership distribution, market power, and the mechanisms to resolve capacity issues or 
structural changes (Boyer 1997: 70). 
 The analysis has also highlighted the critical role of technology to market participation, 
including the provision of buyer information, and the potential barriers posed by lack of 
computer literacy and numeracy skills. Market outcomes, in addition, were found to be 
inconsistent with policy rhetoric with the majority facing long-term capacity issues and one 
suffering chronic failure. A further important aspect strongly signalled by the results of the 
analysis is the interaction between markets and thus the strong potential for cumulative 
impacts. For example, the adequacy of electricity generation capacity is being threatened by 
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the uncertainty about the operation of the carbon trading market which, when implemented, 
will lead to price increases in all other markets. These prospects provide a picture of some of 
the perils and pitfalls arising from 21st century real world markets and pose potentially ‘wicked 
problems’ for policymakers. 
 Finally, the observed disjuncture between the institutional architecture of Australia’s 
mode of régulation and neoliberalism’s free market rhetoric was confirmed by the analysis to 
be replicated between the policy rhetoric and the structure, operation, interactions and 
outcomes of actually existing markets. But perhaps most importantly, this analysis of five 
contemporary Australian markets has starkly illustrated the market regime which is an 
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